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ABSTRACT 
Although it took place over only 18 days, the 2011 Egyptian Revolution was a significant 
socio-political event in modern Middle East history. As a part of an upsurge of protest 
movements across the region, the Egyptian revolution followed Tunisia’s successful 
revolution. These protests incited many questions and intersectional studies that have 
looked at economic, social, and political factors that came into existence leading to the 
“Arab Spring.” Focusing on Egypt as a case study, this thesis examines the economic 
motives of the revolution that grew out of those factors. Specifically, it focuses on the 
concepts of poverty, unequal income distribution, and youth unemployment as major 
reasons of the protesters’ unrest. Change in the political system has had a clear impact on 
the country’s foreign relations and stability in Middle East. Therefore, understanding the 
role of economic motives in the revolution is vital to understanding Egyptian foreign 
relations and their influence on stability. Moreover, studying the role of those economic 
conditions in Egypt could be helpful for any other country concerning future policies 
regarding uprisings and political instabilities. Thus, the results of this study could be used 
to assess an alternate and more sustainable strategy aimed at maintaining and promoting 
stability. 
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Since the beginning of 2011, many Arab countries have been experiencing change 
in riots. This change has resulted in revolutions in some countries. Real change began in 
the small country of Tunisia, where dozens were left dead following a month of violent 
protests and demonstration, which made thousands of people rush out into the street. Ben 
Ali, the Tunisian president, fled to Saudi Arabia with his family on January 14, 2011, and 
protests gained its first success, causing a revolution.  
Riding the wave of revolution, millions of Egyptians gathered in cities on January 
25, 2011, especially in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. At the outset, tensions were high between 
the protestors and police, and violence not only spread in Cairo, but also in Suez. The 
government took harsh precautions against these tensions, applying riot-control 
strategies, and prevented all types of communication. However, protests had reinitiated 
by January 28, and the police had moved back. The security mission was assumed by the 
military, disregarding major problems in the everyday security mechanism. As the 
pressure on President Hosni Mubarak increased, the scale of the demonstrations kept 
rising, mainly at organized Friday gatherings.  
As in Tunisia, the conditions in Egypt made the country ripe for revolution. A 
small group of businessmen, mostly friends of Gamal Mubarak (son of Hosni Mubarak), 
had full control over the economy and were running it in pursuit of personal interests. 
Forty million Egyptians, half the population, were living below the poverty line, on less 
than two dollars a day. A few rich people lived liked kings in their palaces and resorts, 
travelling in private planes, whereas poor people were unable to feed their families and 
were committing suicide or sometimes dying in fights to obtain cheap bread or bottles of 
propane.1 The army of Egypt finally joined with the struggling population and overthrew 
Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, following the protests and brutal police response that 
made the country chaotic.  
                                                 
1Alaa Al Aswany, On the State of Egypt: What Made the Revolution Inevitable (London: Vintage 
Books, 2011), 7. 
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A. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
The 2011 Egyptian Revolution, although it took place over only 18 days, was a 
significant socio-political event in modern Middle East history. The revolution began 
with street protests demanding political, economic, and social changes, and concluded 
with the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak. Promising presidential and parliamentary 
elections within the year, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took power 
temporarily. 
As a part of an upsurge of protest movements across the region, the Egyptian 
revolution followed Tunisia’s successful revolution. These protests incited many 
questions and intersectional studies that have looked at economic, social, and political 
factors that came into existence leading to the “Arab Spring.” Focusing on Egypt as a 
case study, we will examine the economic motives of the revolution that grew out of 
those factors. Specifically, we will focus on the concepts of poverty, unequal income 
distribution, and youth unemployment as major reasons of the protesters’ unrest. 
Exploring the time period from Gamal Abdel Nasser to Hosni Mubarak is vital for 
analyzing important social changes that were caused by the various economic systems the 
Egyptian leaders put in force. It is also significant to indicate that the past decade 
experienced a constant increase in uprisings throughout the country, and social 
movements and political opposition had steadily increased those uprisings’ burden. The 
system was slowly failing; it was just a matter of how and when it would collapse. 
Change in the political system has had a clear impact on the country’s foreign 
relations and stability in Middle East. Therefore, understanding the role of economic 
motives in the revolution is vital to understanding Egyptian foreign relations and their 
influence on stability. Moreover, studying the role of those economic conditions in Egypt 
could be helpful for any other country concerning future policies regarding uprisings and 
political instabilities. Thus, the results of this study could be used to assess an alternate 
and more sustainable strategy aimed at maintaining and promoting stability. 
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Whether the poverty, unequal income distribution, and youth unemployment are 
the only reasons for the January 25, 2011 Revolution, it is still important to study these 
factors as they may ultimately have an impact on other countries in the near future. The 
civil unrest across the Middle East took the world by surprise, and therefore, it is vital to 
study and understand the role and the possible impact of the economic conditions on 
revolutionary change. Studying and closely monitoring these economic motives aids in 
the effort to understand the enthusiasm of those who seek to create political change under 
oppressive authoritarian rules. In addition, studying economic conditions can offer insight 
as to why regimes may re-strategize domestic and foreign economic policies depending 
on whether or not the economic conditions of people pose a threat to their rule. The 
governments that have assumed control following the overthrow of the former abusive 
governments should try to address such grievances and inequities as soon as possible; 
otherwise, they may face the same fate as their predecessors, and much blood will have 
been spilled in vain. 
B. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The primary analytical methodology is a process-tracing method, which is part of 
the case study approach.
2
 We will use the last ten years of Egypt’s economy before the 
revolution as the focus of the thesis. In the last part of the thesis, we will include the 
lessons learned from this case study and suggestions for how to apply these lessons to 
other case studies.  
We will not provide a statistical analysis, but will use statistical data to show the 
effects of the economic conditions before the revolution. We will use the recently 
revealed sources about the socio-economic situation of the Egyptian people, and will use 
surveys such as the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE), and the Household 
Income, Expenditure, and Consumption Survey (HIECS) 2010‒2011.  
                                                 
2 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), 52, 136.  
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This thesis will include an historical study starting from the Hosni Mubarak ruling 
era, which began in 1981, and look into the political aspect of the reforms and explore the 
political events that affected the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. These incidents are mostly 
the well-known conflicts, such as Friday gatherings. 
We will use survey data, collected by researchers, articles, books, newspapers, 
and online resources during my research. As the surveys include the opinions of ordinary 
people who experienced the economic conditions before the revolution, this study will 
provide some insight into the motivations that led to the revolution.  
We will provide four main chapters and conclusion one, which will elucidate the 
reasons behind the revolution in deep. Chapter II, “Critical Views on the History of 
Revolution in Egypt,” will explain what revolution is, its place in Egyptian history, and 
the views of scholars on the causes of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Chapter III, “What 
Causes a Revolution?” will chiefly focus on why factors other than poverty, such as 
inequality and unemployment, were not the main motives behind the revolution, and why 
they did not play a big role in inciting people to the street. In Chapter IV, “The Role of 
Poverty in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution,” we will discuss the changing poverty 
conditions in Egypt, and their role in the revolution. Chapter V, “Poverty and Inequality 
as Contributing Factors,” will investigate the role of inequality and its relation to the 
poverty that we discussed in the previous chapter. It will demonstrate that inequality was 
one of the most important factors leading to the revolution in Egypt. In Chapter VI, “The 
Role of Unemployment in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution,” we will clarify why 
unemployment among the youth was another main reason causing the revolution. It will 
show how unemployment increased for the young people prior to 2011 and made the 
young desperate with no hope for the future. For the last chapter, we will summarize the 
conclusions that we came up in each chapter and give a clear picture of why the 2011 
Egyptian Revolution happened. 
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II. CRITICAL VIEWS ON THE HISTORY OF REVOLUTION IN 
EGYPT 
This chapter provides an overview of the critical analyses and definitions of 
revolutions in general. It also offers a brief history of revolutions in Egypt and concludes 
with critical views on the 2011 revolution in particular. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Revolution is a process of rapid and fundamental change of social, economic, and 
political systems, leading to the collapse of an old regime and its associated elite. By 
studying concepts and historical examples of revolutions, we can find some valuable 
points common for all revolutionist movements, thus helping analyze the motives for the 
Egyptian Revolution.  
Ted Robert Gurr defines revolution as a “highly organized political violence with 
widespread general participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state 
and [it is] accompanied by extensive violence.”3 The term revolution can be used 
differently in many contexts; however, it usually means a violent overthrow of a regime 
or social structure or a great sudden change in social principles. A revolution typically 
characterizes a complete change from one way of doing something to a different way that 
usually represents the reverse.  
Gurr writes, “men are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to 
anger when those means prove inadequate, but slow to accept their limitations.”4 He also 
states that, “people act out their frustrations if they believe that they stand a chance of 
relieving some of their discontent through violence.”5 He explains this by signifying that 
angry people are likely to be more open to arguments, so emotion eliminates the 
calculation, making their acts less than rational. 
                                                 
3 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 11. 
4 Ibid., 58. 
5 Ibid., 210. 
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Jeff Goodwin provides two definitions for revolution. In one, he defines 
revolution as “any and all instances in which a state or a political regime is overthrown 
and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extra-constitutional, or 
violent fashion.” He narrows his definition and points out “revolutions entail not only 
mass mobilization and regime change, but also more or less rapid and fundamental social, 
economic, or cultural change, during or soon after the struggle for state power.”6 Both 
definitions tell us that revolutions are instruments for changing a system. 
From another perspective, Jack Goldstone defines revolution as “an effort to 
transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in society, 
accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and non-institutionalized actions 
that undermine authorities.”7 He does not talk about large mobilization movements. He 
simply mentions revolution as an effort to change political institutions. 
Proponents of Marxist thought use the term revolution in a very particular way. 
While reforms are changes in the existing social and cultural system, social revolutions 
cause a sudden shift from one social order to another. For example, Theda Skocpol 
described revolution as the “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class 
structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts 
from below,”8 attaching revolutions to a combination of several conflicts between state, 
bourgeoisies, and the lower class. She also states, “Revolutions are not just extreme 
forms of individual or collective behavior. They are distinctive conjectures of socio-
historical structures and processes,”9 attributing revolutions to social elements. 
                                                 
6 Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945‒1991 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9, 407.  
7 Jack A. Goldstone, “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 4, no. 1 (June 2001), 139, 142. 
8 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and 
China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 4. 
9 Theda Skocpol, “France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 18, no. 2 (April 1976), 177. 
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What observable political conditions ought to prevail before a revolution begins? 
Charles Tilly states that three conditions appear to be necessary, and a fourth strongly 
facilitating. Following are the four necessary conditions.  
1. Alliances or coalitions of contenders, bringing forward claims to the 
control of the state that is currently being controlled by the members of the 
regime.  
2. A significant part of the given population’s commitment to those claims.  
3. Reluctance or ineffectiveness of the government to put an end to these 
alternative coalitions or people’s commitment to their claims.  
4. Establishment of alliances or coalitions between members of the regime 
and the contenders bringing forward alternative claims.
10
 
From a different point of view, James DeFronzo explains conditions that make 
revolutions possible in terms of five factors: mass frustration, divided elites, unifying 
motivations that unite different social groups in support of revolution, a severe political 
crisis for the government—including legitimacy loss and loyalty of armed forces—and a 
permissive or tolerant world environment in which other nations do not intervene to stop 
a revolution from developing.11 
He argues that a high amount of mass discontent usually stems from three 
conditions independently or a combination of them: a decline in living situations; a 
change in the moral tolerability of current conditions involving people feeling that their 
lives can and should be better; or a period of betterment in the people’s living conditions 
followed by a severe decline.12 Displeasure prior to an outburst of a revolutionary 
movement is often deepened by sensational events that stir up many people, such as 
violent government suppression of challengers. 
According to Jack Goldstone, revolutions rarely triumph because the conditions 
mentioned previously rarely coincide. Monarchic states are able to sustain popular 
support by making appeals to respect nationalism and royal tradition. Privileged elites, 
                                                 
10 Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?” Comparative Politics 5, no. 3, Special 
Issue on Revolution and Social Change (April 1973): 425‒447.  
11 James DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
2007), 12. 
12 DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 13‒14. 
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who are often enriched by such governments, will only abandon them if their conditions 
or the doctrine of the rulers changes radically. It is difficult for a general mobilization to 
triumph because it requires reconciliation of the different interests of the rural or urban 
poor, students, the middle class, and many ethnic or social groups. There are many events 
in history, such as student activists, workers’ strikes, and peasant uprisings, which were 
quickly suppressed because they were a movement of one single group rather than a large 
united effort. Moreover, other international states have often gotten involved in these 
uprisings to support authoritarian rulers in order to preserve balance and make the 
international system stable.13 
Even if revolutionary efforts fail, they can result in significant social change. 
Government or dominant groups will make concessions to settle down the protestors who 
are trying to make an important change in society. Even if these concessions do not 
satisfy the people’s demands for total change, they can indicate significant progress. At 
times, social change can take place step-by-step because even unsuccessful revolts may 
gradually lead a society into a different way until a new lifestyle is finally achieved. 
Not all turbulence should be labeled as revolution. Political turmoil is highly 
possible during the process of modernization. In Samuel Huntington’s words, “It is not a 
lack of modernity, but rather the effort to achieve it that causes political turmoil.”14 
Social mobilization and economic development may be disruptive. For example, 
economic development results in high economic inequality and social mobilization 
causing that inequality to be less legitimate.15 A discrepancy between the public well-
being and private interest becomes apparent when a culture improves, resulting in the rise 
of corruption as a problem. This problem can lead to the entrance of new groups to the 
current political system, or it can promote economic growth if government creates it 
through the expansion of government regulation. Though corruption may weaken the 
                                                 
13 Jack A. Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle 
Eastern Autocracies,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 8‒16.   
14 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1968), 41. 
15 Ibid., 59. 
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current regime, it can make political parties stronger and, in fact, promote political 
development in countries where the regime has too much authority.
16
 
As discussed previously, Skocpol states that social revolutions are rapid and basic 
transformations of a society’s state and class structures. What makes social revolutions 
important is that basic changes in social and political structure occur, and these changes 
take place by means of intense sociopolitical conflict.17 In the end, these changes lead to 
the collapse of one system and the erection a new one. 
The French Revolution was a social and political one that supplanted feudalism 
with capitalism. People did not just get rid of the monarchy, but also they killed 
thousands of aristocrats who had taken advantage of people for centuries. Peasants made 
up most of the people, and the feudal relationship between those peasants and landlords 
was eradicated. This change paved the way for capitalist relationships of manufacture and 
trade. 
In Comparative Revolutionary Movements, Thomas H. Greene argues that if 
economic conditions of a state worsen, they can lead to a revolution.18 The reason for the 
economic downturn, which led to the overturning of the government in Ghana in 1966, 
was the worsening agricultural production that caused great trade imbalance, a huge 
overseas loan, and extremely high unemployment rates.19 Likewise, the economic crisis 
between the 1970s and 1980s in Poland exploded in enormous revolts and high rates of 
discontent.20 Neil Smelser states that economic issues, such as unemployment, food 
scarcities, rising food prices, and decreased earnings are related to the upsurge of 
violence between Mexico and England in a situation similar to what was seen before the 
French Revolution.21  
                                                 
16 Ibid., 69‒70. 
17 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 3. 
18 Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall Publishing, 1990), 19. 
19 Ibid., 96. 
20 Ibid., 97. 
21 Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg, The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 73. 
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One of the most important factors that gave rise to the Mexican revolution in 1911 
was the economic crisis that the country experienced at the end of Porfirio Diaz’s rule. 
High levels of inflation and unemployment rates in the last four years of Diaz’s reign 
caused Mexico to experience deterioration and stagnation. Decline in the price of sugar, 
which was the country’s chief export product, was the main reason behind the decline in 
the Mexican economy. Likewise, in Cuba, the over-dependence on sugar as an economic 
incentive brought about high levels of unemployment and worsening economic 
conditions when exports to the United States diminished. The Cuban economic crisis of 
the late 1950s was attributed solely to sugar production levels and the ensuing 
unemployment. This over-dependence on a single business, together with widespread 
corruption and nepotism by the Batista government, also brought about increasing 
unemployment rates, particularly during non-growing seasons. The living standard in 
Cuba decreased dramatically because Cuban wages were unable to contend with high 
inflation levels during the 1950s.22 
B. HISTORY OF REVOLUTIONS IN EGYPT 
Making revolution is not something new for Egyptians, because they have had 
three momentous revolutions in their modern history. One of them was the 1881 Urabi 
Revolution which dethroned a crooked and comprador monarch. The other two include 
the Revolution of 1919, which almost overthrew British military hegemony, and the 1952 
revolution, which initiated the military despotism of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak for 60 
years. Creating the second parliamentary regime on the African Continent, the first 
revolution turned out to be successful before foreign military intervention changed the 
form of government. After the defeat, the British formed a colonial rule in Egypt for 
more than 70 years. The second revolution was a persistent, widespread revolt controlled 
by a range of pro-democracy protestors from many different civil societies. Although 
violently suppressed, it did compel the British to make some concessions. The third 
revolution in Egypt was different from the first two, because it was a revolution that went 
                                                 
22
 Brian H. Pollitt, Sugar, “Dependency,” and the Cuban Revolution (Glasgow, Scotland: University of 
Glasgow, 1985), 196‒197. 
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out of its way to restrict popular involvement.23 During this era, there were strict 
restrictions on people’s way of life and the country was under the control of dictators. In 
1881, the regime of the royal family ended and a course of British removal from Egypt 
began. 
C. VIEWS ON THE CAUSES OF THE 2011 EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 
What are the causes that gave rise to the important synergy and resistance in the 
most recent revolution in Egypt? Three main reasons have emerged to explain this 
mystery: technology, Tunisia, and discomfort.
24
 It is obvious that Tunisian unrest was a 
catalyst, motivating Egyptians to rush out into the streets. The Tunisian government was 
even more oppressive than the government of Egypt. So if the Tunisians were able to rid 
themselves of their ruthless dictator, why could the Egyptians not manage to rid 
themselves of theirs? Tunisian upheaval might have been the starting point, but there 
were many other important changes in Egypt’s political and social environment that also 
gave rise to the revolution. Egyptians had increasingly resorted to protests and street 
politics to claim their demands and disrupt the position of their leaders. Since 2004, 
Egypt had seen an increasing number of protests and rallies led by textile and health 
workers, judges, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, transportation workers, and even property 
tax collectors. These workers wanted better salaries and working conditions, as well as 
relief from the harsh poverty that had distressed most of the people. By contrast, the rich 
became richer, and the public organizations that in the past had delivered service to poor 
Egyptians descended into disrepair, and jobs decreased as well.25 People fell into a 
miserable situation where there were no hopes left for a better future for their children. 
There are many other assessments regarding the origins of the Egyptian 2011 
Revolution. Political thinker and strategist Dr. Tarek Heggy, one of Egypt’s more famous 
authors on the subject of political reform in Egypt, states that the Egyptian people’s 
desire for democracy, the ruling system, and legal elections were the main motives for the 
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25 Saba Mahmood, “The Architects of the Egyptian Revolution,” The Nation, February 14, 2011. 
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revolution. Another specialist, Mohammed Fadel, states that bribery and corruption in the 
government were the most important reasons behind the revolution.26 
Mona El-Ghobashy expresses in her article that the 2011 Revolution occurred 
because there had been an unexpected change in the equal distribution of resources 
between the ruled and the rulers.
27
 She also provides three reasons for the revolution: 
“technology, Tunisia, and tribulations.”28 Moreover, Ursula Lindsey has argued that 
social media, whereas it did not directly bring about the upheaval, shared a significant 
role in connecting the people who would later join in the protests.
29
 The Bank 
Information Center (BIC)
30
 in 2007 reported that the World Bank had identified the 
following problems as among the most tenacious challenges that Egypt faced in fighting 
poverty and maintaining sustainable development: high unemployment, increasing 
poverty, social and economic inequality, high budget deficit, and net public debt. Every 
problem, whether it was corruption, the country’s foreign policy, economic conditions, or 
social problems, played a role in motivating Egypt’s people to revolt. 
Young people in particular had important access to information and 
communication networks, such as mobile phone services, new social media, and TV. 
These forms of communication became even more important as events blossomed. While 
the government used the state’s information disseminating systems to spread propaganda 
against the rebellions, the protesters dispersed their message by using means that were 
creative, disciplined, and revolutionizing. The victory of the revolution, at least as its 
main demand, the resignation of Mubarak, was associated with the defamation of state-
controlled newscast and a blossoming of home-produced media of all kinds.31 
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While social media did not create the Egyptian uprising, they played an immense 
role in getting together many of the young people who would ultimately join the 
demonstrations. We Are All Khalid Sa’id was one of the Facebook groups that was 
created in 2010 to honor a young man who died after being beaten by police; it had more 
than a half-million members in the protests on January 25, 2011. These groups were 
instrumental in organizing the protests and a new expression has come into the Egyptian 
language. The Internet-led generation that organized the initial protests is known as the 
Facebook Kids.32 
In general, street politics and, in particular, Arab street politics were more 
complicated. The Arab street is chiefly an appearance of public sentiment, but it has 
experienced important changes in its style and way of expression. Street politics is the 
contemporary theater of discontent people. It has played a great role in such massive 
political events as the French Revolution, anti-colonial fights, nineteenth-century 
industrial movements, the Velvet Revolution in Eastern Europe, and various anti-war 
protests. For ordinary people, the street is the main site of politics, and is the chief place 
to spend time for those who do not generally have positions of power. It is at the same 
time social and cultural, continuous and present, a home of the strange and the familiar, 
the visible and the verbal; the street symbolizes a complex place where opinions and 
attitudes are formed, spread, and voiced in a unique way.33 
Economic inequalities and poverty among different groups of society are 
important precursors for many revolutions. Claude Welch and Mavis Taintor mention 
those concepts in addition to rapid economic worsening, poverty, and inequalities 
between manufacturing and the distribution of that merchandise.34 Cynthia McClintock 
argues that the inconsistency between global and domestic markets causes the latter to 
depend on the former, concerning reliance on industrialized states for technology and 
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money.35 Barry Schultz and Robert Slater state that this dependence essentially triggers 
the separation of society and the diminishing of rural population.36 
The chronic structural problems affecting the Arab world came to a head prior to 
2011 through a combination of persistently high unemployment, especially among youth 
(and educated youth at that), internal regional and social inequalities, and poverty due to 
the deterioration of economic conditions because of the global 2008 financial crisis and 
food price increases. Beginning in the next chapter, we will explore in detail why other 
common contributing factors in Egypt, such as corruption or lack of democracy, were not 
the main factors behind the 2011 Revolution—unless they caused unbearable deprivation 
or poverty and economic inequality. Then we will explain the three main reasons 
mentioned in the earlier chapters, poverty, unequal income distribution, and high 
unemployment rate among the youth. 
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III. WHAT CAUSES A REVOLUTION? 
The 2011 Egypt revolution attracted significant expert analysis, especially 
concerning the motives of the revolution. A group of analysts has argued that 
dictatorship, religious and ethnic tensions, and the prevalence of gross corruption in 
government, were some of the main triggers of the Egyptian revolution. However, a close 
analysis of the 2011 revolution in Egypt shows that these factors are not sufficient 
catalysts for a revolution, unless they caused an unbearable deprivation or poverty and 
economic inequality.  
A. WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION 
To begin with, there is a strong belief that blatant corruption within the 
government was one of the main factors that caused the 2011 revolution. Those who hold 
this position argue that the prevalence of corruption within the government denied 
Egyptians economic empowerment. However, a close analysis of the 2011 revolution in 
Egypt shows that the revolt was not caused by a prevalence of corruption in the 
government. It is true, though, that corruption in Egypt was prevalent just before the 
revolt. Ann Lesch revealed that the corruption reached the highest scale in Egypt in the 
mid-2000s following the appointments of new cabinet ministers who used their positions 
to promote corruption.
37
 According to Lesch, the newly appointed ministers used their 
influence to acquire and sell a large portion of the public sector for their personal gains. 
In addition, they also discouraged public investment in agriculture, education, housing, 
and health and land reclamation. In addition, the ministers promoted private investments 
in areas that only benefited them at the expense of the Egyptians. For instance, the most 
important ministers had connection with the key economic sets such as Ahmed al-
Maghraby, minister of housing, was a big player in the hotel realm and Mohamed 
Mansour, minister of transport, was a car dealer.38 
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Despite the high prevalence of corruption, experts believe that it did not influence 
Egyptians to revolt against the government. According to Yolande Knell, corruption 
neither caused an unbearable deprivation nor economic inequality in Egypt.
39
 For 
example, despite the prevalence of corruption in the country, Egyptians continued to live 
a relatively decent life compared to their neighboring countries. Similarly, corruption did 
not prevent Egyptians from going about their businesses. Egypt is among the few African 
countries that have attained significant development despite the high corruption in the 
country. This clearly indicates that high corruption in Egypt was a minor factor for the 
2011 revolt. Furthermore, corruption had been high in Egypt since the mid-2000s. As a 
result, if corruption had been the main issue, then Egyptians could have protested much 
earlier without necessarily having to wait until 2011. In this respect, the corruption in the 
country could only have catalyzed the revolt if it had caused an unbearable deprivation 
and economic inequality. However, in this case, corruption did not cause an unbearable 
deprivation and economic inequality.  
B. LACK OF DEMOCRACY 
Lack of democracy is also cited as a catalyst for the 2011 revolution in Egypt. A 
group of politicians has argued that the many years of dictatorship of President Mubarak 
catalyzed the 2011 revolt. Lesch noted that President Mubarak enjoyed over three 
decades of dictatorship by establishing a bureaucratic government in which all powers 
were centralized in the executive branch.
40
 Mubarak also created a presidential system in 
which the president was appointed by the People’s Assembly, though the appointment 
had to be ratified by public referendum. The system enabled him to serve for six five-year 
terms with automatic renewal by referendum. Lesch also noted that power was 
consolidated to the extent that the president made all appointments, including mayors, 
deputy mayors, and governors.
41
 Furthermore, Mubarak created a system in which local 
council leaders were elected based on the winner-take-all system. The system provided 
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the ruling party with a monopoly of power, which encouraged corruption and nepotism 
among all local government offices.  
Analysis of the 2011 revolution shows that lack of democracy did not catalyze the 
revolution. For example, Egyptians had lived under a dictatorship for more than three 
decades without protest. This clearly indicates that Egyptians did not revolt against 
Mubarak because of the dictatorship. Furthermore, as much as democracy was lacking in 
the government, Egyptians were not absolutely deprived of their rights. They were not 
entirely disenfranchised as voters since they had the power to vote through a referendum. 
Additionally, Egyptians also enjoyed economic empowerment, which enabled them live a 
relatively high standard of living compared to their neighboring countries.
42
 In fact, a 
very small percentage of Egyptians were jobless. Furthermore, over half of the country’s 
million people were not poor despite the dictatorship. In fact, protesters carried posters 
during the revolt which contained mainly information regarding the deteriorating state of 
the economy; rather than denouncing the governance. For example, most placards carried 
information regarding “Bread” and youth unemployment. This clearly indicated that the 
revolt was much about the deteriorating state of the economy. As a result, Lesch 
concluded that the lack of democracy was a minor contributing factor for the 2011 
revolution in Egypt. 
C. RELIGIOUS TENSION 
Egypt is a country that is largely Muslim, with the Coptic Christians being the 
minority. Analysis of the Egyptian revolution has indicated that religious tension might 
have contributed to the 2011 revolt in Egypt. Hassan argues that Mubarak concentrated 
on dividing Egyptians along religious and tribal lines by oppressing the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafis under the guise of fighting terrorism, while sympathizing with 
the Coptic Christians.
43
 However, a close analysis of the revolution shows that tribal and 
religious animosity did not catalyze the revolution. The revolt involved not only the 
Muslim Brotherhood, but also the Coptic Christians. As much as the Muslim 
                                                 
42 Duncan Green, “What Caused the Revolution in Egypt?” The Guardian, February 17, 2011, A6. 
43 Amro Hassan, EGYPT: Religious Conflict Becomes the Revolution’s Biggest Enemy, Los Angeles 
Times, May 9, 2011, B.7. 
 18 
Brotherhood was the majority of those who participated in the revolt, a significant 
number of Coptic Christians and other tribes also participated in the revolt. The 
involvement of the Coptic Christians and other tribes that were favored by Mubarak in 
the revolt is a clear indication that tribal and religious tension did not catalyze the 
revolution.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Certainly, the 2011 revolution in Egypt is the most discussed revolution in recent 
history. Although several reasons have emerged as causes of the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution, analysis indicates that lack of democracy, the prevalence of government 
corruption, and tribal/religious tensions were not primary catalysts to revolution. In 
Egypt, these factors did not contribute significantly to the revolution since they did not 
result in an unbearable deprivation and economic inequality. Accordingly, the Egyptian 
revolution was a protest about the deteriorating state of the economy, which resulted in 
increased poverty, unemployment, and increased unequal income distribution and 
disparity. For instance, youth unemployment has increased significantly over the past few 
years. Together with unequal income distribution, the increased unemployment among 
the youths contributed largely to high poverty level in the country. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF POVERTY IN THE 2011 EGYPTIAN 
REVOLUTION 
The reasons behind the remarkable street fights that compelled the Egyptian ruler 
Hosni Mubarak to step out of office was something that exists in many countries 
worldwide—food shortages or poverty. Worsening economic situations fed the 2011 
revolution and remained a significant component in the political uprising.
44
 While critics 
bring into focus corruption in government, or the domino effect of the Tunisian 
movement, the failure of the Egyptian government to sustain a continuous flow of food 
supplies should be viewed as the main factor igniting the revolution. 
A. FAILED ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE RISING COST OF LIVING 
Hosni Mubarak did not change the course of the Egyptian economic policy that 
Anwar Sadat had initiated; his advisors did not change it either, because they found it in 
their interest to guide him not to change it. More important is that most of his advisors 
had been chosen by Sadat from those having loyalty to the United States because they 
believed that the United States was the only power able to keep him in office. Besides, 
the peace agreement signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979 resulted in the Arab states’ 
discontinuance of assistance to Egypt for a long time.45 Those conditions placed Egypt 
into a larger dependence on assistance from the United States. President Mubarak 
continued to borrow from other countries where loans were accessible; however, he 
stopped when those countries stopped providing loans to Egypt. Not only did Egypt’s 
situation show no promise of repayment, but also foreign states such as Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates, had much less money to give following the significant 
downward slope in oil revenues.46 
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Egypt’s external loans continued to grow during the first five years of the 
Mubarak era, until the whole debt amount surpassed $45 billion. Although it grew by 50 
percent in five years, the increase rate of the loan was still lower than the increase rate of 
the Sadat era. This trend continued until the 1990 Gulf War, which was begun abruptly 
by Saddam Hussein’s assault on Kuwait. The total debt rose to $47.6 million in 1990, and 
accounted for 150 percent of the entire gross domestic product (GDP). It made Egypt’s 
debt amount rank as one of the highest in the world, and greater than the debt amount 
Egypt had already experienced many years earlier, which caused the toppling of the 
monarch Ismail the Magnificent.47 During the next ten years, Egypt’s foreign debt 
amount remained constant when compared to the six times’ increase during Sadat’s ten-
year regime and the 60 percent increase throughout Mubarak’s first ten-year regime. 
Egypt’s foreign debt escalated by only $5.4 billion between 1994 and 2004, which 
reflected 22 percent during that time.48  
It is not likely for any country to carry on borrowing forever. A shortfall must 
come about in debt service and money lenders begin to worry about their money. Then, 
the debtor nation arrives at a new point when it pays back more for its past debts than the 
new loans it takes. Only when lenders lose confidence in the country’s financial success, 
do they stop lending and demand repayment. Nonetheless, it is also possible to elucidate 
the relative steadiness in Egyptian growth rates with the following reduction in imports.49 
Egypt set itself free from requesting more loans by enhancing the balance of payment due 
to reduced imports and the large decrease of the debt service as well. 
From 1986 to 2004, the growth rate of GDP (see Figure 1) did not exceed 4 
percent, and caused a fall in the amount of growth of per capita income to less than 2 
percent. These figures were less than those reflected in both the Sadat and Nasser eras. 
The inflation rate fell in the years between 1986 and 2004 due to the austerity policy, but 
the unemployment rate rose steeply, and incomes grew increasingly unequal. 
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Development occurred in the economic system;50 however, this development was not a 
long lasting one and did not result from investment in industry or trade. Conversely, it 
resulted from selling the state properties that were the profit-producing assets of the 
country. In the short run, it may seem profitable for the country to raise its revenues by 
selling its property holdings; however, in the long run, it resulted in decreasing revenues 
entirely, thus lowering salaries.  
 
Figure 1.  Egypt Annual GDP Growth Rate, 2000‒2012  
(from Central Bank of Egypt). 
The characteristic feature of this pre-revolution development was the selling off 
of the public sector. Privatization talks began in the 1970s; however, during the 1970s 
and 1980s, denationalization was strongly resisted by the Egyptian bureaucracy and the 
manufacturing labor unions. In 1991, after Egypt signed an agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund and The World Bank, the pressure from the International 
Monetary Fund and the United States government to privatize amplified.51 The 
government began moving forward with the intention of opening the doors wider to 
imports, privatization, and subsidy reduction, and providing greater amenities to foreign 
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companies. In 2005, private foreign investments in Egypt doubled from the previous 
year, and then doubled again between 2005 and 2007. The government announced that 
the GDP growth rate had been 7 percent or more (see Figure 1), and had stabilized at 4 
percent for almost two decades. According to the government, this showed that the period 
of gloom was over and that an era of rapid development had begun. The achievement was 
credited to the astuteness of the government, compared to all previous governments.52 
While the new government was acknowledging its achievements, the Egyptian 
poor were fighting in front of bakeries to acquire subsidized flatbread. The size of the 
bread had shrunk over time and its color had turned dark. Moreover, the bakery owners 
were refusing to give out the number of loaves requested by the poor.53 Power cuts, fuel 
shortages, and soaring food prices put pressure on the population.
54
 
GDP accounts statistics were inconsistent with the growth of household incomes, 
as can be concluded from the Egyptian Household Income, Expenditure, and 
Consumption Survey (HIECS).
55
 Although GDP showed a steady growth between 2000 
and 2009 (see Figure 1), household incomes displayed a slight decline. Growth occurred 
only among top income families, and these families were not well captured by household 
surveys. The comparative performance of top earners also had an impact on perceptions. 
It is significant to study the correlation between top incomes and disparity to understand 
who takes advantage of GDP increases, and how people fall into poverty despite the 
increase of GDP.  
B. SOARING FOOD PRICES AND SUBSIDIES 
The foundation of Egypt’s economy was broken, there was a huge concern 
regarding the falling of global food prices. Agricultural inflation exerted a special 
pressure on Egypt’s middle class people, because their wages were overwhelmingly spent 
toward nourishment. Figure 2 illustrates this damaging pressure. 
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Figure 2.  Egypt’s Monthly Spending by Category (from Credit Suisse 
Emerging Consumer Survey, 2013). 
It is not by chance that poor people who are crushed by rising food prices will rise 
up against their political leaders. The common notion was that 40 percent of Egyptians 
lived below the $2-a-day income poverty line. Strangely, no one acknowledged the 
Egyptian level of poverty. At the peak of the world economic boom, when Egypt 
recorded annual economic growth rates of 7.2 percent, the proportion of Egyptians living 
below the $2-a-day poverty line increased significantly from 17.8 percent to 23 percent 
(see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.  Poverty Headcount Ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population) (from 
The World Bank, 2013). 
According to the report released in 2010 by the Egyptian Council of Ministers, the 
number of Egyptians living below the poverty line had risen from 17 percent to 22 
percent between 2000 and 2010.
56 
Egyptian youth were familiar with such sufferings, 
both personally and politically. As stated by the 2009 countrywide survey, they placed 
poverty reduction in first place for national priorities (see Table 1) 
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Social Issue Reported as Very Important Percent Ages 15‒29 
Poverty Reduction 92 
Fighting Rising Prices 90 
Fighting Corruption 88 
Reforming the Education System 86 
Strong Defense Forces 86 
Reforming the Health Care System 85 
A High Level of Economic Growth 78 
Protecting Freedom of Speech 75 
Protection of Political Rights 64 
People Have a Larger Role in Government 63 
Political Leaders With Stronger Religious Beliefs 53 
Table 1.   Social Issues Reported as Very Important (from Population 
Council, 2010). 
Low pay and an upsurge in food prices, which increased by 32 percent alone in 
2010 according to the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization, hurt the fast-
growing and urbanizing population in Egypt. It was not only the increasing food prices, 
or a lack of growth that stirs up revolutions, but also the continuation of extensive and 
chronic poverty among gradually increasing affluence.57 The failure of the Egyptian rule 
to guarantee a stable supply of food was the main factor driving this apparently natural 
upheaval. The triple convergence of suffering from reduced conditions, political 
corruption, and incompetence of government is what makes Egypt special concerning 
food shortages.  
The Nile River sits at the center of the severe environmental deterioration in the 
region. An overdependence on its resources was joined with a long period of negative 
effects resulting from damming plans, leading to water shortages and decreased harvests 
from arable land. The subsequent crisis caused increasing prices for drinkable water and 
decreasing vital yields in planting. Water was more expensive than soft drinks in many 
                                                 
57Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011,” 8‒16. 
 26 
parts of Egypt.58 The Mubarak regime declared harsh restrictions on the production of 
main crops such as rice only a few months before the uprising. The reduced rice harvest 
had viral effects. Prices for rice increased sharply, and so a key nutritional food was taken 
away from the poor. Meanwhile, as rice was also a main export yield, agricultural 
workers lost their jobs as well.  
Did the rise in food prices and the increase of Egyptian poverty related to it have a 
damaging effect on Egypt’s social and political stability? Absolutely; however, both in 
2008 and in 2011 Egypt was among one of the wealthiest countries. The rapid rise in 
food prices, which made Egypt highly dependent on food imports, resulted in a rapid 
increase in the number of Egyptians living below the poverty line. More than three 
million Egyptians fell below the poverty line during a short period in both uprisings as 
well. 
The demonstrations against food prices surged in Egypt in spring 2008. Beginning 
on April 6, 2008, the chief event was the demonstration of factory laborers in the 
business city of al-Mahalla al. The workers’ opposition targeted the decline of living 
conditions brought about by the rise in food prices. Mubarak tried to suppress the 
movement by means of police, refusing the demands to raise the minimum pay rate that 
had existed for 26 years. He did not allow the workers to negotiate wages that might 
compensate for the increased food prices. Consequently, he tried to form a state cartel on 
the production and delivery of low-priced bread. Once the black market endangered this 
cartel, he made the military take command of the enterprise.
59
 
Victories were rare despite the intensifying protests in 2009 and 2010. Most of 
them were either disregarded by the government or violently suppressed. The few and 
trivial successes were mostly because of the stubbornness of the activists. They 
persuaded the government to increase the minimum salary to 400 Egyptian pounds, 
which nearly four times what it had been, but scarcely enough to meet the rising inflation 
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expenses. They successfully established two independent business organizations and an 
independent business federation, which was a unique relief from the overpowering hold 
the Mubarak regime had applied over labor activism since 1957.
60
 
To attract foreign investments between 2004 and 2008, Mubarak’s regime 
followed economic reforms; however, they failed for many reasons, and the poor living 
standards of Egyptians continued. Imprudent governance during the 30-year military 
regime and the desire to reduce economic problems were great incentives to rebel against 
Egypt’s government. Economic and financial indicators illustrated that the economic 




C. EGYPT’S OIL DEPENDENCY AND POVERTY 
For the world’s agriculture system, oil is an important resource, and it appeared 
that the peak oil
62
 supporters proved to be right. Despite the increasing demand and a 
tripling of prices in Egypt, yearly oil production failed to increase after 2006. Egypt was 
forcing the limits of growth. The occurrence of peak oil changed everything. It started in 
countries that were most vulnerable, such as Egypt; however, its consequences were felt 
worldwide in the oil dependent international economic system (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4.  Egypt’s Oil Production, Consumption, and Exports (from BP 
Statistical Review, 2013). 
Egypt faced many problems with energy and food subsidies due to its economic 
condition, which was deteriorating together with the rising cost of food imports. As 
displayed in Figure 4, oil exports, imports, and extraction rates per year were declining.   
Following 1995, a steady decline in exports gave rise to a steady decrease in oil 
exports—almost to zero—making the food subsidies unbearable in the economy of 
Egypt. Figure 5 illustrates the link between oil prices and food prices. The food crisis is a 
complex matter; however, it is a notion of an increasing population and improvement in 
the living conditions at odds with declining agricultural production. Problems stemmed 
from many conditions, including water depletion and soil depletion, rising growth, and 
weather conditions that caused producing problems in several countries, such as Australia 
and Russia. As Figure 5 illustrates, something occurred between 2007 and 2009 after 
nearly two or three decades of price stability.  
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Figure 5.  Similarity of World Food Price Trend and Brent Oil Price Trend, 
January 2000‒August 2010 (from FAO Food Price Index, 2010). 
Because of the decreased harvest the cost of production and transport began 
increasing with increasing oil prices, and the price of imported food, particularly wheat, 
began to escalate. Figure 5 uses the FAO Food Price Index and displays the Brent Oil 
Price as a main exchange benchmark price for buying of oil worldwide. The graph shows 
that when oil prices are higher, food prices of all sorts are also higher. In production, 
storage, and transit of grain, oil is used directly; thus, its price is important. 
As Egypt’s oil production decreased, products of dependent industries, such as 
chemical and refining, decreased as well and made it hard to collect revenues from these 
sources. One of Egypt’s main sources of revenue was the Suez Canal, but as world oil 
exports were down, revenue from it was down as well. 
After 2010, Egypt became an oil importing country, whereas it had been an oil 
exporting country before. The fact is that Egypt was not the only country experiencing 
decreased oil production. World oil production had been roughly stable since 2005, and 
the countries that dug the oil were increasingly consuming much of it themselves. There 
was less oil at hand for export, and countries such as Egypt needed even more. Egypt was 
making money for the subsidies with the oil that it exported, so decreased exports 
resulted in less available money for subsidies.  
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D. NEED FOR FOOD IMPORTS 
The population of Egypt had been rising swiftly, at approximately 2 percent per 
year (see Figure 6), and according to the CIA World Factbook and the Egyptian 
population was 81.1 million in 2011 (see Figure 7). 
Figure 6.  Egypt Growth Rate Annually, 2000‒2012. 
 
Figure 7.  Egypt’s Population Growth since 2000 (from CIA World Factbook, 
2011). 
As the population rose, the need for land for businesses and housing rose as well, 
and the needed land for agriculture fell. Egypt was able to harvest less of its own food at 
that time. In fact, Egypt was the world’s greatest wheat importer in 2010. The oil minister 
stated that country was importing 60 percent of its wheat and 40 percent of its food.  
With Egypt becoming a net food importer—including that of over half of its 
wheat requirements—it had become particularly vulnerable to global food price and 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Egypt 1.72 1.69 1.66 1.88 1.83 1.78 1.75 1.72 1.68 1.64 2.00 1.96 1.92 
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exchange rate fluctuations. The value of food imports to total merchandise was moderate 
in Egypt between 1990 and 2010, and has continued a declining trend. It reached its 
lowest level in 2005, followed by a subsequent upwards trajectory (see Figure 8). This 
highlights that Egypt’s ability to finance its food imports was weakened during the global 
food price crisis (between 2008 and 2010).63 
 
Figure 8.  Value of Food Imports over Total Merchandise Exports (from FAO 
Statistics, 2010). 
According to BIC reports, Egypt was getting economic aid from many foreign 
countries and multilateral organizations. The United States was the largest supporter, 
having provided Egypt with $72 billion in assistance since 1948. Almost three decades 
after Mubarak’s holding power, Egypt’s economy continued to be heavily dependent on 
rent-seeking, which caused negative consequences for sustained growth. Between 1987 
and 2006, Egypt’s mean per capita GDP annual growth was 2.2 percent, when compared 
to a lower middle income state mean of 5 percent.64 U.S. aid started to reduce in 1998 
from $815 million to $411 million per year in 2008 and to $250 million later.65 Although 
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the monetary assistance received from these countries was very important, it was difficult 
to recognize the amount of the total Egyptian budget for which it accounted. Egypt was a 
chief receiver of U.S. assistance and established a hazardous relationship with worldwide 
food markets. In the wheat marketplace, the Egyptian government had to buy a great deal 
of wheat to address the increasing food demands and retain social peace. 
The system of buying food from foreign countries appeared to do well until 2010 
when Russia, one of the major exporters of wheat, experienced the worst drought in the 
last five decades. Prices ascended suddenly on the global market and as the greater 
importer of Russian wheat, Egypt was compelled to pay $270 per ton for wheat in August 
2010, increasing from that of $238 in July of 2010.66 The country was dependent on 
worldwide companies for 40 percent of its wheat consumption even though the 
government said that self-sufficiency was its main goal. Moreover, water shortage on the 
Nile levied agricultural constraints as mentioned earlier and guaranteed that the dearth of 
food self-sufficiency would rise at some point.67  
Even though it was a significant policy to sustain a political system, the Egyptian 
people did not survive only on wheat. Rising prices of bread, lack of water, and sharp 
rises in the price of other fundamental products were the basic factors of discontent 
among people. For many planters, tomato production was their chief source of income, 
and they depended on a promising harvest to pay their debts; however, according to the 
government’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), an 
extraordinarily hot summer decreased many of the farmers’ harvests from 20 tons to 3 
tons. Vegetable prices increased by 51 percent, and poultry and meat by 28.6 percent in 
September 2010. The Agricultural Research Centre (ARC) said that crop productivity had 
dropped by almost 70 percent in 2010 because of hot weather.  
It is well known that food supply and prices were a reason for social turmoil in 
Egypt. The Egyptian Bread Riots, which occurred in 1977, broke out after the 
government ceased its subsidies for basic foods. Many were killed and injured when 
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thousands of people who lived in poverty rushed into the streets. In 2007 and 2008, 
nearly 30 years afterwards, as food prices increased, people took to the streets again. Fear 
that interruption in providing wheat and bread in Egypt would occur again resulted in 
fatal riots. 
For Egyptians, bread has been a dietary staple because it is affordable. Egyptians 
receive more than half of their calorie needs from wheat, and the proportion is even 
higher for those dwelling in cities.
68 
Production of food had increased; however, it was 
not sufficient to keep up with the population increase or per capita use. Egypt had 
subsidized basic supplies to promote industrial development by keeping urban salaries 
low. Egypt had also taken great responsibility for nourishing the people by means of its 
import subsidies and policies.
69
 The increased food costs added to any already high 
inflation rate in Egypt, which was reported to be 12.8 percent in 2010 by the CIA World 
Factbook. As salaries did not rise to keep up with inflation rates, inflationary problems 
forced the government to raise subsidies, and was ultimately unable to provide more 
subsidies. Despite the ration cards for bread and government subsidies, the price of wheat 
in Egypt was nearly 30 percent higher than it was a year before. According to a consumer 
survey from Credit Suisse, Egyptians already spent more than 40 percent of their salaries 
on food.
70
 In 2008, rapidly increasing wheat prices provoked bread riots in Egypt.
71
 The 
government responded with an enlarged subsidy program in an effort to keep food prices 
stable. Nonetheless, Egypt was depending on purchased wheat for 60 percent of its 
supply; and everything from Australian floods to Chinese drought had an impact on the 
supply of wheat. Other impacts included the embargo forced by Russia after its 
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destructive drought in 2010. Such environmental conditions and export bans helped 
worsen the food riots in Egypt. 
Richard China, Director of FAO’s Policy and Programme Development Support 
Division, stated that the food crisis of the 2007 and 2008 indicated that resolutions taken 
in a hasty manner by governments to alleviate the influence of the crisis had worsened 
the crisis and intensified its impact on food instability. Facing these pressing social needs, 
the Mubarak regime held tight to power by means of severe measures, while widespread 
violence was boiling in the streets. Only one reason contributed to the increased need for 
food: an extra 13 million people, and half of the needed food in Egypt was supplied by 
purchases from the worldwide marketplaces and foreign aid.72 
E. CONCLUSION 
Egypt was a great food importer and this made it highly vulnerable to fluctuating 
food prices throughout the world. Thus, when Egypt became routinely dependent on 
receiving the majority of its food supply from other countries, it opened itself to food and 
economic crises.  
To sum up, the rapidly increasing prices of food were important, highlighting the 
economic and social background to the revolt. The rebellion in Egypt was more than an 
attempt to gain political freedom. It was literally a fight for survival. The lack of food 
was a catalyst for this uprising.  
After clarifying how the “poverty” pillar played a role in stirring people to take to 
the streets, Chapter V will address the increasing poverty levels among Egyptian people 
as one of the most important factors for the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and will evaluate 
the second pillar, which is “unequal income distribution.” We will elucidate what 
inequality means for people and how it caused the Egyptian people to revolt.  
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V. POVERTY AND INEQUALITY AS CONTRIBUTING 
FACTORS 
Revolutions arise from inequalities, quantitative or qualitative, typically from a 
large segment of the population claiming a social equality denied them, or from a 
minority claiming a privilege denied them. In all revolutions, the conditions that lead up 
to the upheaval are the desire of the many for equality, and the desire of the minority to 
protect the status quo. They take to the streets to protect their profit, honor, or to avoid 
dishonor. The inciting occasions are many: jealousy of those who have wealth and honor, 
official arrogance, fear of the law or of its abuse, personal rivalries, failure of the middle 
class to maintain a balance, race antagonisms, antagonism of localities, and others.73 
Inequality is another pillar other than poverty that led to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, 
inspiring people to acquire what they did not have.  
Having previously examined the role that poverty played in inspiring people to 
revolt in Egypt, we will show how inequality is related to poverty, because one of the 
main results of inequality is poverty in a community. Next, we will discuss the role of 
inequality from the perspective of poverty and subjective well-being, which often results 
in a gap in expectations and current conditions, and causes an uprising in the people (i.e., 
the Egyptian Revolution). 
A. WHY INCOME INEQUALITY MATTERS 
How does inequality within a country cause conflict? A renowned theory, is Ted 
Gurr’s Relative Deprivation Theory.74 Gurr argues that a large gap between the expected 
and actual economic and living conditions of a group can fuel conflict. While Gurr does 
not talk explicitly about gaps between rich and poor, arguably, frustrations about the gap 
between expected and actual living conditions are likely to increase even more when the 
poor are constantly confronted in their daily lives by the conditions of the rich.
75
 The 
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poor rebel against the rich to acquire wealth, and the rich fight against the poor to protect 
their wealth. 
Inequality impacts growth and other macroeconomic issues all around the world. 
There is no need to look further than the income inequality, which has generated the 
dissatisfaction that stimulates the latest disorder in the Middle East. To form a simple 
connection, more income inequality is associated with less persistent growth. Figure 9 
demonstrates the relationship between the income distribution and the span of growth for 
a sample of countries during the period of 1950 through 2006.76 The growth spell is a 
period-of-time comprising at least five years that begins with an uncommon rise in the 
growth rate and ceases to exist with an uncommon decrease in growth. This table shows a 
general trend for many countries around world, including Egypt. The Gini coefficient 
technique was used for preparing this graph, which is the classic method used in most of 
the world to measure income inequality varying from zero to 100.77 
 
Figure 9.  Inequality and Growth Relationship (from Penn World Tables and 
Wider World Income Inequality Database, 2013). 
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It may seem contradictory that income inequality is strongly related to less 
persistent growth. Nevertheless, some inequality is necessary for the effective running of 
a market economy and the encouragement required for investment and growth.78 Too 
much inequality, however, could be harmful to growth. It might cause political turmoil, 
impeding investment, and amplifying the potential environment for financial crisis. In the 
presence of economic shocks, governments may find it harder to take difficult but 
necessary decisions, such as imposing taxes or cutting public expenditure to avoid a debt 
crisis. Then again, economic inequality may mirror poor people’s inability to get 
financial services, which gives them fewer opportunities to invest in education and 
business activities.79 
Income inequality decreases the buying power of middle and low income people, 
reducing aggregate demand; however, people deriving benefit from inequality seek high-
yielding investments, leading to the rise in mass of assets. Insufficient regulation and 
invalid monetary policy stir up more economic uncertainty and lower growth rate.80 
Dealing with the income inequality is vital because inequality adversely affects 
progress in terms of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)81 and poverty 
reduction. It retards development in general, and leads to ineffective resource allocation 
and misused potential productivity, as well as high rates of dependency, particularly food 
dependency mentioned in the previous chapter. It decelerates economic growth (Figure 
9), leads to social and health problems—including worsened education outcomes—
worsens poverty (Figure 10) and unemployment rates (Figure 11), and results in social 
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and economic inequalities among children, generating political and social insecurity and 
clashes (Figure 12).
82
 Examples in Figures 10 through 12 were taken from Arab 
countries. Using data from 2012, these graphs show that there is a close relationship 
between inequality and many crucial social problems such as poverty, unemployment, 
and civil war. For all these issues, the graphs draw a general pattern to indicate that when 
income inequality increases, other problems also increase.. 
Viewed together with other Arab countries, Egypt struggled with the same 
problems, although as displayed in the graphs, its economic position was always lower. 
Although the graphs only include a few Arab countries, they display a general trend 
related to inequality for the all countries. It may seem contradictory at first glance to see 
Egypt in these graphs at the bottom, and one may argue that inequality did not much 
affect Egypt in terms of poverty, unemployment, or conflict. It can easily be seen from 
the graphs that Tunisia was most affected by inequality and it was the first country that 
went through revolution. Moreover, other countries that did not experience revolution, 
such as Morocco or Algeria, were also affected by inequality, which weakens the 
argument about inequality causing the revolution in Egypt. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter and as will be discussed in Chapter VI, income inequality, along with poverty and 
unemployment, caused the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. These graphs are sufficient to 
contend that inequality is highly related to poverty, unemployment, and contentious 
movements.  
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Figure 10.  Inequality and Poverty Relationship (after World Bank, 2012). 
 
Figure 11.  Unemployment and Poverty Relationship (after World Bank, 2012). 
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Figure 12.  Inequality and Civil War Relationship (after World Bank, 2012). 
B. SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 
There has been always a gap between reality and people’s expectations. 
Revolutions are likely to occur when the gap widens. The 2011 Egyptian Revolution was 
not a surprise except to those who had shut their eyes to the truth of the economic, social, 
and political problems that had been accumulating for a long time. The general 
understanding in Egypt before the revolution was that social inequality in some way and 
unequal allocation of resources were deep-seated problems. On January 25, 2011, when 
the Egyptian revolution broke out in Cairo, Suez, Alexandria, and in other parts of Egypt, 
many activists from different social groups and faiths demonstrated against President 
Mubarak’s rule and the existing economic inequality. 
“Subjective well-being (SWB)” demonstrates how people evaluate the quality of 
their lives, and it encompasses both emotionally expressed reactions and rational 
judgments.83 Measurement of subjective well-being provides an alternative yardstick of 
development that mostly depends on people’s experiences; however, this measurement 
may diverge from the portrait presented by common metrics that only evaluate the access 
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of people to resources. Particularly, depending on peoples’ experiences and evaluations 
of their everyday life, measurement of subjective well-being is simply used to get 
information on the perceived well-being of respondents considering the influence of 
changes in economic and social conditions, and the effects of those changes in tastes and 
references to them. Measurement of subjective well-being, in addition to being a source 
of information for combined changes in a country, can also be a useful source to see 
which social groups are dissatisfied or are experiencing a worse life.84  
Contrary to the common belief that subjective well-being is generally limited to 
measurement of happiness; it consists of a more diverse range of concepts. In particular, 
subjective well-being includes: 
Good mental states, including all of the various evaluations, positive and 
negative, that people make of their lives and the affective reactions of 
people to their experiences.85 
This definition is very inclusive, covering the many different aspects of subjective 
well-being. Above all, it comprises measurement of the evaluation people make about 
their experiences as a whole. Even so, it also reflects people’s level of satisfaction with 
their fiscal situation or health condition, as well as the meaningfulness or purpose of their 
life. This description of subjective well-being, therefore, involves three concepts: 
1. Life evaluation: a person’s reflective evaluation of his life, 
2. Affect: a person’s moods or emotional conditions,  
3. Eudaimonia: meaning and purpose of life, or good mental health.86 
The relative deprivation theory of Gurr suggests that it is the, “perceived 
discrepancy between value expectation and value capabilities” that motivates people to 
revolt.87 It is not only the reality of deprivation that can create revolution but also the 
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perception of this deprivation. Hardship on its own does not stir up people to revolt. To 
move from sorrow to mass action, people must first realize “a sense of social injustice.”88 
Gurr states that the impression that societal distribution of pain is unjust and suffering is 
expected is one of the leading prerequisites to action. If Tunisia’s revolution became the 
trigger for Egypt’s revolt, the gap between what Egyptians wanted and what they had 
provided the fuel. Egyptians’ sense that they were not profiting from the country’s 
economic growth laid the groundwork for the overthrow of Mubarak.89 
C. GDP GROWTH AND DISCONTENT AMONG PEOPLE 
It was the “disconnect” among people that led to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, 
because they were treated unfairly by a small group of rich people who got the greater 
portion of GDP.
90 
Poverty alone did not cause the revolution and the overthrow of 
Egypt’s government. The difference between what was and what should be was the most 
important factor forming the chief motive for the country’s historic revolt.91 
With real GDP growth numbers of 4.1 percent in 2004, 4.5 percent in 2005, and 
6.8 percent in 2006, the Egyptian economy had recorded robust growth in recent years. 
Moreover, exports increased from $7 billion in 2001 to $18.4 billion in 2006, that is, 160 
percent. As a percentage of GDP, exports grew from 7.6 percent to 17.3 percent. After 
experiencing deficits, extending from 1 to 3 percent of GDP from 1997 to 2000, the 
current number had increased since 2001, mostly due to increased exports of petroleum 
products, recording an excess of 5 percent in 2003 and 2004, and 2 percent in 2005. The 
total investment amount reached 18.7 percent of GDP, and foreign direct investment 
increased to 6 percent of GDP. The balance of payment account recorded excesses of 
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$1.8 billion in 2005 and $1 billion in 2006, thus helping the Central Bank to raise its 
foreign reserves, which led to $22.7 billion by October 2006.92 
Economic growth in Egypt increased the wealth of a small group, but many 
experienced decreasing access to this wealth (see Figure 13.) The figure shows that with 
the GDP growth “thriving”93 the percentage of rich people was increasing, while it was 
decreasing for poor people. While Egyptians dreamed of the highest democratic 
ambitions of the region, it had the lowest. Many tolerated a paternal state-citizen type of 
state, where people agreed to less freedom in return for high-grade social services 
provided by the state; however, Egyptian people got neither. As Egyptian contentment 
about their freedom diminished, so did their satisfaction with services provided by the 
state. This double deterioration suggests that, according to many Egyptians, the old 
regime had been more similar to a prison guard than a generous father.94 
 
Figure 13.  Percentage of Population Thriving (after Gallup, 2010). 
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Prior to 2011, there was a decline in contentment that was in contradiction with 
the more promising growth of GDP figures. Even as GDP increased, the well-being of 
Egyptians declined substantially. In Egypt, the percentage of people thriving dropped by 
17 percent since 2005 (see Figure 13). This demonstrates how perceptions can render 
information on very important results in societies that other classical indicators such as 
GDP growth do not render.95 
 
Figure 14.  Trends in Subjective Well-being and GDP in Egypt, 2005‒2010 
(after Gallup, 2010). 
D. DISCREPANCY OR MISCALCULATION OF GINI COEFFICIENT 
One of the baffling aspects of the measurement of economic inequality in Egypt 
was the use of household surveys,96 which do not appear to agree with people’s 
perceptions. Both formal governmental statistics and the World Bank indicate that the 
Gini coefficient97 had been declining during the last decade (2000‒2010) from 36.1 
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percent to 30.7 percent in 2009.98 This last percentage is lower than regional and 
international standards and it is also unusual for countries with low income that undergo 
rapid growth phases. Egypt had experienced a much extended growth period since the 
late 1980s. From 1996 to 2010, Egypt saw a growth rate of more than 5 percent, with 
peaks of over 7 percent from 2006 to 2008.99 
In fact, the Gini coefficient is mostly subject to various statistical problems 
because it usually includes families who may underreport or not report their incomes. 
Moreover, the Gini coefficient is sensitive to extremes in income values. When rich 
families have a tendency to take part in surveys less often than poor families, the Gini 
coefficient may be miscalculated. Alternatively, if the rich report their incomes 
erroneously, the resulting incorrectness may greatly skew the Gini coefficient.100 From 
another point of view, it might be said, for example, that when the richest 5 percent of the 
inhabitants was receiving 40 percent of the national revenue but now gets 30 percent, and 
the poorest 20 percent was receiving 3 percent of the national revenue but now receives 5 
percent, it is accepted as progress in income distribution. This alleged improvement in the 
state of the poor is not real because such statistics are not enough to tell about whether 
the poor may be in a worse or better economic condition than they had been. Their 
proportion of the national revenue might really have been greater than it was, but their 
needs or ambitions might have increased as well, thus putting them in a more desperate 
situation. In such a situation, the increased level of buying power is useless in terms of 
people’s contentment. On the other hand, the attitude of the rich toward them might have 
grown worse, causing the poor to feel even deeper desperation. Moreover, their acquiring 
a better portion of the national revenue might have become more depreciating, causing 
them greater alienation.101 
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According to the HIECS 2011, in rural areas 26,500 households were sampled. 
The HIECS do indicate two important aspects of consequences that could actually help 
explain the incongruity between realities and perceptions. The first consequence the 
survey shows is that household welfare did not improve with the GDP growth. This 
would suggest that growth did not flow into the life of the whole population. Thus, even 
though families might have been reading stories about economic growth in newspapers, 
they were not feeling it directly. When people read and hear about economic growth, 
their expectations evidently increase for a healthier and better future; however, when they 
do not have most of the benefits of this growth, it frustrates those same expectations.102 
The second consequence the survey shows is that the incongruity between GDP 
growth and household well-being increased in the years leading to 2011. This can be seen 
in Figure 15 by the gap between GDP growth on the one hand and income growth on the 
other, which increased suddenly from 2006 to 2010 right before the revolution. It is also 
obvious that not only the gap between GDP and measured household revenue had 
increased according to the HIECS but also the gap between GDP and household 
consumption increased according to national accounts. The statistics show an important 
gap between the expected increase in income and its real increase, rather than an 
improvement in inequality—a gap that widened over the years leading up to the 
revolution.103 This indicates what made people discontent about their life and motivated 
them to want more than they had, thus taking to the streets to fight for it. 
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Figure 15.  GDP, Income, and Expenditure Relationship (from World Bank, 
2009). 
E. WHAT DO THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE THINK? 
Covering the same period as the HIECS, World Values Surveys (WVSs)104 
measured the general perceptions of the Egyptian people on economic inequality from 
2000 to 2008. The World Values Survey is a comprehensive survey of opinions and 
views about a diverse range of topics. This survey includes a question about how people 
think of inequality, using a scale from one to ten, where one shows an aspiration for more 
equality and ten shows that people overlook higher levels of inequality.  
As stated by WVSs, the years between 2000 and 2008 also experienced a notable 
change in people’s perceptions on a wide range of topics. Preferences among Egyptians 
shifted from common concerns about freedom to very physical desires about stable food 
prices and GDP growth. Consistent with the HIECS data, there was also an obvious 
decline in the amount of reported pay and economic status. Families were poorer in 2008 
than they were in 2000, and they were of the opinion that they were a part of a lower 
social class. When compared to concerns about pay, concerns about social status 
increased even more. The data suggests that individuals became more conscious of their 
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social status, and as opposed to absolute status, they became more conscious of their 
relative status.105 Actually, the concern for social status explains the dislike for income 
inequality more explicitly than for the income itself.  
As people draw benefits directly from the economic growth of their country, GDP 
and subjective well-being normally correspond to one another. For instance, growing 
GDP typically creates expanded enterprise and job opportunities. Nevertheless, as 
Egypt’s GDP grew, people’s perceived access to this new growth declined. In 2010, only 
the richest top 20 percent of Egyptians regarded their lives as better than they were in 
2009.106 
The public showed great dissatisfaction on many issues. One of those displeasures 
was the ease with which individuals could get official licenses to set up a new business, 
thus benefiting from Egypt’s economic growth. According to the Legatum Prosperity 
Index,
107
 Twenty percent of the Egyptians in 2010 said the government made the official 
procedure easy enough for businesspersons to start a business, as opposed to 26 percent 
who said the same in 2009.108 In spite of the substantial growth, which made Egypt’s 
industry globally competitive in key areas and raised the economy to lower-middle 
income status (World Bank definition) during the past two decades, a prevalent feeling of 
financial injustice fueled the anger for the revolution.109 So, the population did not 
approve of the government even though the economy had improved, because they did not 
directly benefit from that situation. Moreover, the government did not use the revenues 
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from economic growth to deliver better social services to the population. If the job of 
government is to help people or to help people help themselves, then it had failed. 
To some extent, income inequality is probably related to the sometimes stark 
divide between urban and rural households. Along with the government’s inability to 
invest in rural infrastructure, the rapid increase in population hastened migration to 
already crowded cities, where the socially dislocated new inhabitants were last in line for 
rare jobs in the formal economy. Inequality is also heightened by the gradually increasing 
gap between the wealthy, benefiting disproportionately from market liberalization and 
privatization, and just about everybody else. Certainly, an aforementioned 0.32 Gini 
index is comparatively low by global figures—lower than in the UK and the United 
States. But it must be remembered that the Gini coefficient number mirrors income 
inequality instead of wealth inequality, which had swollen in very noticeable ways, 
particularly in the numbers reflecting housing quality.110 There is also proof that the 
increase in food and fuel charges worldwide over the last decade increased the number of 
Egyptians experiencing real poverty. 
Paradoxically, reforms designed to increase speed of economic growth had 
demolished the social fabric of the middle class, as well. College-educated young 
Egyptians were no longer able to get civil service jobs in a period of privatization and 
greater budget discipline, and were rejected for professional jobs in private initiatives 
because they lacked family relations and connections or technical abilities not having 
been sufficiently trained in colleges.111  
F. CONCLUSION 
A rising GDP did not mean a rising standard of living. Even if the GDP were a 
more correct evaluation method of material well-being, it would still be mathematically 
likely for a great number of people to live in worse off economic conditions as GDP 
rises. This situation could happen if there is rising income inequality. In Egypt, that 
mathematical likelihood became an economic fact. 
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Deteriorating standards of well-being were politically disruptive, and had 
naturally enough support for regime change. The regime was dictatorial in Egypt, and the 
demand for change arose as a commitment to democracy, a hatred for corruption, and 
demands for civil rights. By contrast, in democracies, deteriorating standards of living 
can have the opposite outcome. Institutionalized and open methods of regime change, 
such as voting, ease discontent for the moment; otherwise, people would look for new 
methods to satisfy their discontent.112 
The lesson from Egypt is that GDP is a measure of the aggregated money in an 
economy, not a measure of distributed well-being. If persistent or growing well-being is 
what is politically and economically requested, it should be measured directly, not by 
GDP alone. No type of government, whether despotic or democratic, succeeds when the 
most of its citizens experience a deteriorating standard of living.113 People are more 
likely to overthrow that government if they feel that they are not being heard, that their 
suffering is not being addressed adequately, when they see a small percentage of the 
population profiting from national economic growth and policies, and when they are 
reminded of the widening economic inequality.  
The Egyptian government was not able to perceive what was going on in the 
streets and what people were thinking about the way of life they had. The government 
was under the illusion that it would solve the problem with short-term policies such as 
importing food; however, it made everything worse. It is recommended that the 
government of Egypt should take its people’s pulse regularly, even if statistics show that 
they are doing well in economic terms. They can do this by conducting everyday surveys 
or holding elections on a regular basis. 
Chapter VI considers unemployment among the youth in Egypt as the third pillar 
leading to the revolution. In addition to discussing poverty and unequal income 
distribution, we will evaluate the unemployment issue in correlation with these two 
topics. These three problems are all are correlated each with one another.  
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VI. THE ROLE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE 2011 EGYPTIAN 
REVOLUTION 
As the third pillar of the causes of 2011 Egyptian Revolution, youth 
unemployment played a critical role in stirring people to revolt. Having previously 
discussed poverty conditions among poor people and unequal income distribution of 
annual GDP being the two leading reasons of the revolution, we will take into 
consideration “youth unemployment” as the third important factor causing people to 
revolt. At first glance, it may seem that unemployment and poverty, which we discussed 
in the Chapter IV, are intertwined. However, unemployment is more crucial than poverty 
because people would be in a more desperate situation without a job, thus forcing them to 
revolt against the system.  
Joined by ambitions and demands such as freedom, better incomes, and better 
working conditions, Egyptians from many parts of life took place in the protests. 
However, what formed the basis of the revolt was bewildering numbers of young people 
participating in demonstrations, and those numbers were essential to maintaining the 
protests. Hundreds of thousands started to get together in Tahrir Square in Cairo and 
other cities across the country. Egypt’s youth were the key element behind this 
rebellion.114  
A. POPULATION STRATUM 
Although there are many other reasons for the revolution in Egypt, it can be said 
that the high level of youth unemployment is one of the most important motives for the 
crisis.  
The absence of employment not only means income deficiency but also a 
deficiency of personality, self-respect, and respectability. It is not surprising that 
discouragement, monotony, and despair are common among unemployed people. 
Widespread unemployment among young people in close connection with widespread 
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dissatisfaction provides fertile ground for revolt.115 Employment serves as both an 
apparent function to earn a regular income to meet the basic needs of people, and as an 
underlying function to achieve a respectable position in the society and to become more 
socialized. 
During Mubarak’s 30-year reign, the Egyptian population increased from 45 
million people to 85 million people (see Figure 16), which accounted for 90 percent of 45 
million. This dramatic increase in population occurred despite the government’s intensive 
campaign to slow down the population surge. Egypt had an undeniable demographic 
strength, not just in its overall population but its census distribution as well. Egypt was 
experiencing a youth bulge. Egypt had an overwhelmingly young population, a powerful 
engine of renewal for the country; one in five Egyptians was between ages 15 and 24, and 
one-half of the population was below age 25 (see Figure 17).116 
 
Figure 16.  Egyptian Population Pyramid (from CIA World Factbook, 2014). 
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Figure 17.  Egyptian Population Pyramid (from CIA World Factbook, 2012). 
B. YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT 
At the beginning of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, young people certainly had the 
most at risk. The results of the revolution would have a direct impact on their lives and 
would bear future consequences in how they would build up their own next stage of life. 
They were a generation requesting access to good quality education, assured 
employment, and the economic steadiness necessary to start a family. 
It is noteworthy that youth unemployment in Egypt was running at more than 30 
percent whereas the general unemployment rate was 9.7 percent in 2010 according to the 
CIA World Factbook.117 Millions of young people throughout the country were too angry 
for a long time about the lack of jobs. As such, the feeling of desperateness resulting from 
inadequate work prospects came to a breakpoint. With a corrupt government that ignored 
investing in the younger generation, possibilities for the future seemed very sad. 
Consequently, a large part of the unemployed youth felt the necessity of working 
informal underpaid jobs, creating employment for them, or waiting for the recession to 
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end and for their elders to retire.118 Young people, as a result, became increasingly 
frustrated and upset.  
The 2010 Annual Report of the Population Reference Bureau revealed that every 
year 700,000 newly graduated students looked for 200,000 employment openings, 
indicating that 90 percent of the people unemployed in Egypt were young people. During 
the January 25th revolution, the educated unemployed young people formed the basis of 
the demonstrators that were in the streets.119 The percentage of new individuals entering 
the job market was at about 4 percent a year, making the unemployment rate in Egypt 
nearly ten times as high for college graduates, who were mostly educated urban young 
people, as it was for elementary school graduates.120 Egypt’s youth were the ones behind 
this 2011 revolution. They were forming the largest portion of the protestors during the 
Tahrir revolts requesting a job to meet their daily wants and live a better future.  
Moreover, the Population Council’s 2009 survey conducted among young people 
in Egypt showed that 30 percent of the youth between the ages of 15 and 29 was looking 
for ways to migrate, especially to an oil-rich Arab state, and mainly because they could 
not even imagine finding a job in Egypt.121 Seventy percent of jobless young people said 
that they were unemployed because there was no work available for them. Additionally, 
more than 40 percent believed personal links with the powerful were more essential than 
personal talents in getting a job.122 The youth did not have hope for the future to find 
even a low-paid job to meet their daily needs, not to mention their social needs. 
Furthermore, another reason for young people to encounter serious difficulties in 
finding jobs was not only owing to the dearth of jobs proportionate to the numbers of new 
students in the labor market, but also because of the lack of a good education system. 
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From another perspective, secondary and higher education had seen high entry levels for 
both young girls and young boys, but this high level of enrollment was not followed by 
higher job opportunities and pay for the young. Those who were not able to find a job 
often worked at low-paid jobs with bad conditions. These two unfortunate circumstances, 
high unemployment and low payment, were the main obstacles impeding many young 
Egyptians from getting married and starting a family. Approximately half of all Egyptian 
men between the ages of 25 and 29 were not married.
123
 As reported in the 2010 survey, 
not more than 50 percent of the students with higher education who had taken part in the 
youth survey thought that their education background was sufficient training for the labor 
market.  
C. DEPRIVATION AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE 
The Mubarak rule underestimated the anger of its crowds and young people due 
to economic growth.
124
 As explained in the previous part, The youth did not have 
anything to lose, not a social position in society or a good job, and did not have much 
hope of achieving those in the near future because of growing population rate and 
decreasing job availabilities. They also did not care about the thoughts of the people 
around them if their movements stimulated revolt or contempt. As they felt that there was 
nothing to distinguish them from other young men walking in the streets, they felt 
unimportant and despised themselves. They were not afraid of the police because they did 
not have much to risk, and the policemen themselves did not seem much different from 
these young men.125 
Like many countries with an increasing young population, Egypt struggled to 
create a sufficient number of good paying jobs to keep pace with the needs of the youth. 
One part of the investment strategies of Ben Ali and Mubarak was to provide public 
subsidies to workers and people through programs such as Tunisia’s National 
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Employment Fund, which relied on both private and public donations for the employment 
of development plans all for deprived social groups and poor persons. Another part of 
these strategies was Egypt’s policy of ensuring jobs for young graduates; however; these 
safety packages were put to an end in the last decade to cut costs. Getting public and 
other private employment was under the control of those who had close connections to 
the government, and in many cases, professional training was not sufficient. This resulted 
in extremely high joblessness among the youth in the country.126 
D. CONCLUSION 
Unemployment not only means absence of income, but also the absence of 
dignity, self-respect, and social standing. Disappointment, boredom, and hopelessness are 
common problems among jobless people. Widespread unemployment among young 
people in parallel with widespread disillusionment due to economic conditions paved the 
way for a revolt.  
Numerous factors have had a role in encouraging Egyptians to take to the streets 
on January 25, 2011, projecting and broadcasting their upheaval and passions for the first 
time in many decades. Among a wide variety of different drivers of change were 
overpopulation, youth unemployment, poverty, and unequal income distribution 
throughout the country. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The 2011 Egyptian Revolution is the most debated revolution in recent world 
history. Although several reasons have emerged as to the causes of this revolution, lack 
of democracy, a prevalence of government corruption, and tribal/religious tensions were 
not its main catalysts, because they did not directly contribute to unbearable deprivation 
and economic inequality. Rather, the Egyptian revolution was an uprising against the 
deteriorating conditions of the economy, which resulted in increased poverty, increased 
unemployment, and increased income inequality.  
Establishing the economic and social background of the revolt, the rapidly 
increasing food prices were of high importance. The rebellion in Egypt was more than an 
attempt to gain an ideal such as freedom or social rights. It was literally a fight for 
survival. The lack of food was a catalyst for this uprising, because when one country 
(such as Egypt) becomes routinely dependent on getting the majority of its food supply 
from other countries, it lays itself open to food and economic crises.  
During the several years leading up to 2011, there was a relative increase in GDP 
rates; however, a rising GDP did not mean a rising standard of living. Even if the GDP 
were a more correct evaluation method of material well-being, it would still be 
mathematically likely for a great number of people to live in worse economic conditions 
as the GDP rises. This situation could happen if there is rising income inequality. In 
Egypt, that mathematical likelihood became an economic fact and the second major 
reason for the revolution in 2011. 
The GDP is a measure of the aggregated money in an economy, not a measure of 
distributed well-being. If persistent or growing well-being is what is politically and 
economically requested, it should be measured directly, not by GDP alone. People are 
more likely to overthrow a government if they feel that they are not being heard, that 
their suffering is not being addressed adequately, or when they see a small percentage of 
the population profiting from national economic growth and policies, and when they are 
reminded of the widening economic inequality.  
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As the third pillar for causing a revolution, a high unemployment rate not only 
means the absence of income, but also the absence of dignity, self-respect, and social 
standing. Disappointment, boredom, and hopelessness are common problems among 
jobless people. In particular, widespread unemployment among young people in parallel 
with widespread disillusionment due to economic conditions, paves the way for a revolt.  
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